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Post-quantum signatures

Every vault version sealed since 2026-11-07 carries two digital signatures: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65. This page explains what a signature proves, why a future quantum computer threatens one of them, why the other is called post-quantum, and why BreachSpider uses both.

What a digital signature does

A signature scheme has a private key, kept secret by the signer, and a public key, which anyone may hold. Signing a document with the private key produces a short value; anyone with the public key can check that value against the document. If a single bit of the document changes, the check fails. And without the private key, no one can produce a signature that checks.

BreachSpider's signing service signs each seal manifest: the record of which encrypted bytes were stored for which version, when, and which seal came before. A valid signature means that record was written by the signing service and has not been changed since. See Integrity and backups for the whole flow.

Why Ed25519 is not post-quantum

Ed25519 is a widely used, fast signature scheme based on elliptic curves. Its security rests on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem: given a public key, working out the private key behind it is infeasible for any ordinary computer.

In 1994 Peter Shor published an algorithm that solves discrete logarithms (and factors large numbers) efficiently on a sufficiently large, fault-tolerant quantum computer. Such a machine does not exist today. If one is built, it could derive an Ed25519 private key from its public key and then forge signatures that check. Records signed only with Ed25519 would no longer show who wrote them.

Integrity records are meant to be relied on for years. That is why a signature scheme that holds up against such a machine matters now.

Why ML-DSA-65 qualifies as post-quantum

ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm) is specified in FIPS 204, published in August 2024 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology after a multi-year public evaluation of candidate algorithms. It is derived from the CRYSTALS-Dilithium submission.

Its security rests on hard problems over module lattices (Module Learning With Errors and Module Short Integer Solution). Roughly: recovering a secret from many noisy linear equations, or finding a short vector in a high-dimensional lattice. No efficient algorithm is known for these problems on either ordinary or quantum computers; Shor's algorithm does not apply to them. That is what "post-quantum" means: designed and standardized to resist attacks by quantum computers as well as classical ones.

ML-DSA-65 is the middle parameter set of the three in FIPS 204, targeting security category 3 (comparable to breaking AES-192). Its public keys are 1,952 bytes and its signatures 3,309 bytes, much larger than Ed25519's 32 and 64 bytes, which is acceptable for one seal per stored version.

Why both: a hybrid seal

A new seal (bs-seal/2) is signed with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 over exactly the same manifest bytes, and verification requires both signatures to check. To forge a seal, an attacker would have to break both schemes:

  • If a quantum computer breaks Ed25519, the ML-DSA-65 signature still holds.
  • If a weakness were ever found in the newer ML-DSA, the long-studied Ed25519 signature still holds against ordinary computers.

This hybrid approach is the common recommendation while post-quantum algorithms are still young.

What about the hashes and the encryption?

  • SHA-256 fingerprints: the best known quantum attack (Grover's algorithm) only speeds up searching, roughly halving the effective strength to about 128 bits, which remains out of reach.
  • AES-256 encryption of vault files and workspace backups: likewise reduced to about 128-bit strength by Grover's algorithm, which remains out of reach. The keys are derived from your passphrase in your browser, so their strength also depends on a good passphrase.

Seals made before 2026-11-07

Earlier seals (bs-seal/1) carry the Ed25519 signature only. They keep verifying and are shown as Classical seal (Ed25519). New versions of the same file are sealed with both signatures. The daily anchor, which fixes every organization's chain head, is signed with both signatures, so it covers the older seals too.

Key identifiers

Each seal names the keys that signed it by a short identifier (the first 16 hex characters of the SHA-256 of the public key). On 2026-11-08: Ed25519 f5d5b03ec4359653, ML-DSA-65 39b2f241c9eef5e0. When a key is rotated, the retired public key is kept so earlier seals still verify.