Executive Summary
CVE-2026-76515 is a denial of service in the ClamAV OLE2 file parser where a crafted Microsoft Compound File Binary (CFB) file drives the parser into an infinite loop, exceeding the configured MaxScanTime and stalling scan operations. In OT environments where ClamAV sits on file transfer gateways, removable media kiosks, and historian data diodes, a single malformed file can degrade or halt the malware inspection layer that gates traffic entering the industrial zone.
Technical Exposure Breakdown
The defect lives in the OLE2 parser responsible for handling the OLE2 container format, commonly carried inside Microsoft Compound File Binary documents. According to the grounding data, the vulnerability results from parsing inefficiencies against specifically formatted files. An attacker sends a crafted CFB file into the scan path. The parser enters a state where it fails to terminate, consuming CPU and wall-clock time until the engine effectively hangs. The CVSS score is 7.5.
The attack vector is important for OT defenders to understand. This does not require authentication and does not require interactive access. The trigger is a file reaching a ClamAV scan instance. Any workflow that automatically submits files to ClamAV becomes a delivery mechanism: mail gateways forwarding attachments, USB sanitization kiosks at the IT/OT boundary, file ingress proxies feeding engineering workstations, and data historian import jobs. The attacker does not need to reach the industrial process directly. They only need their file to be scanned.
Because the impact is availability of the scanning service, the second-order effect matters more than the first. When ClamAV is inline and fails open, malicious files pass unscanned. When it is inline and fails closed, legitimate operational file transfers stop. Both outcomes are operationally relevant in a plant. Patch status for this CVE is unknown per the grounding data, so defenders should assume no fix is available and plan compensating controls accordingly.
OT Impact and Compliance Risk
ClamAV is widely embedded in OT perimeter tooling precisely because it is open source and easy to deploy on constrained hardware. That ubiquity is the problem here. A scanning engine that stalls under a crafted file undermines the inspection boundary that many operators treat as a control between the enterprise network and the process network.
Under IEC 62443, this maps to the malware protection and conduit filtering expectations for zone boundaries. If the scanning element can be disabled by an unauthenticated external party, the conduit security claim weakens. For NERC CIP registered entities, CIP-007 malicious code prevention controls that rely on ClamAV need a documented failure mode and an alternate inspection path. Under TSA Security Directives SD-02B and SD-02C, pipeline operators depending on ClamAV for file transfer controls at the IT/OT demarcation should treat a scan-engine DoS as a gap in their segmentation and monitoring measures. Water utilities operating under AWIA 2018 risk and resilience assessments should note the same exposure where ClamAV guards SCADA data exchange.
Compensating Controls
Do not rely on a vendor patch as the only answer, and do not run active scanners against production OT hosts to find affected instances. Active probing of industrial components can crash or brick sensitive devices. Inventory ClamAV passively through configuration management, software bills of material, and existing asset records.
- Enforce strict MaxScanTime and MaxScanSize limits so a looping parse is killed quickly rather than hanging the daemon indefinitely. This reduces the duration of the DoS but does not eliminate it.
- Where operationally acceptable, disable OLE2 parsing or restrict CFB file types at the gateway before they reach ClamAV, moving file-type filtering upstream of the vulnerable engine.
- Deploy a virtual patch at the network layer. A Suricata rule concept: inspect file transfer flows crossing the IT/OT boundary, flag Microsoft Compound File Binary magic bytes (
D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1) arriving from untrusted sources, and rate-limit or quarantine for manual review rather than passing them directly into the scan path. - Isolate scan hosts in a dedicated DMZ with resource controls and automatic restart on daemon hang, so a stalled instance does not block the entire file ingress workflow.
- Define and test the fail state. Decide explicitly whether ClamAV fails open or fails closed in your architecture, and document the operational consequence for audit.
BreachSpider tracks exploitation signals and OT product exposure across 384,000+ CVEs and 10,000+ CVEs linked to industrial automation vendors, so operators can monitor CVE-2026-76515 and related scan-engine risk as advisory details and patch status develop.
